This paper reviews the progress of carbon trading in China and examines the involvement of the state and financial sectors. China witnessed proliferation of domestic carbon markets before attempting to institutionalize the carbon trading regime. Direct and strong government intervention is a key feature of this process. The domestic carbon markets are primarily created, shaped, and operated by the central and local governments supported by a cohort of macroeconomic planners, local economic agencies, state-owned financial institutions, and business organizations with government backing. Key market players are institutionally dependent on the state -much more so than in capitalist economies. Private investments have not been adequately and effectively mobilized due to unfavorable economic, regulatory, and policy conditions. Nonstate financial actors are not an active and influential player. This indicates a hierarchical relationship between the state and finance and a clear asymmetry of power in the organization of China's carbon markets. These observations constitute a notable difference to the international carbon markets, which are subject to the strong influence of private finance. China has put the market-based policy instrument of carbon trading under a substantial concentration of state power. The findings have important implications for understanding the rise of carbon markets in non-traditional capitalist economies.
Introduction
Carbon markets are places where greenhouse gas (GHG) emission permits and certified emission reductions are traded as a standardized commodity in accordance with regulations and agreements, such as the European Union (EU)'s emissions trading scheme (ETS) or the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). In less than ten years they have ascended to the dominant form of institutions for climate change mitigation (Ellerman, Convery, and Perthuis 2010; Grubb 2012; Mol 2012; Spaargaren and Mol 2013) . Global carbon trades recorded a soaring market value of US$176 billion in 2011 (Kossoy and Guigon 2012) . The world's largest compliance carbon market is the EU ETS, which is worth US$148 billion and has just entered Phase III (2013-2020) of its implementation. Progress has also been made outside Europe, with ETSs emerging in New Zealand, Tokyo (Japan), Australia, California, ten northeastern states of the U.S., British Columbia, Quebec (Canada), and South Korea (Flannery et al. 2012; Productivity Commission 2011) . What is common in these schemes is that they all operate in a mature capitalist economy governed by a liberal democratic state.
The rapid growth of carbon markets in the liberal-capitalist world is a product of a coalition of financial, political, and environmental actors who have common interests in turning GHG emissions reductions into a new commodity (Bumpus and Liverman 2008; Lo and Spash 2012; Newell and Paterson 2010; Paterson 2010 Paterson , 2012 Spash and Lo 2012) . Paterson (2012) argues that the power of the financial sector plays a critical role. Carbon markets have become popular because they have enabled the formation of such a powerful political coalition favoring GHG emissions reductions and enabled businesses to imagine a cycle of investments, profits, and growth centered on these markets. The success of emissions trading "lies in part in its capacity to identify such a sector -finance -that can grow precisely because of climate policy" (Paterson 2012, 89) . Carbon markets flourish because they allow capital to accumulate as GHG emissions are mitigated. Prospects for a positive-sum game motivate the coalition of actors to promote carbon markets.
China's carbon markets, however, operate in a different context. In October 2011 the Chinese central government appointed seven pilot ETSs and declared interest in introducing a national ETS. The prospective Chinese ETS is expected to inaugurate the world's second-largest carbon market after the EU ETS and mark a major step forward in creating a global carbon market. Yet, behind the looming prospects are numerous enduring problems. Domestic demand for emission reductions remains weak, as the country is not subject to legally binding emission targets and corporate voluntary commitments on emissions abatement are negligible. The carbon markets suffer from a dearth of actual trading as a consequence (Adams 2013; Han et al. 2012; Yu and Elsworth 2012) .
Furthermore, the state machinery is not designed to run market mechanisms (Gilley 2012; Lo 2013) . China has formally embraced the notion of "socialist market economy" since its 14 th National Congress held in 1992. The post-Mao market reforms have seen the state retaining substantial control over critical industries, commodity markets, and the economy generally. The authoritative governing practice could undermine the capacity of economic and market institutions to support the use of market-based policy instruments for mitigating environmental impacts. This begs that question about how the Chinese domestic carbon markets are being organized and progressing under the substantial concentration of power in the state.
The concentration of state power indicates a notable departure from the view that carbon markets are primarily powered by a finance-led coalition. This paper attempts to stimulate discussion on other possibilities by ascertaining the extent to which Chinese financial and stateeconomic institutions are involved in constructing domestic carbon markets. To address this issue we solicited and analyzed relevant official announcements, government policy guidelines and work plans, media stories, and professional reports related to the regulation and financing of carbon markets in China. This paper presents an assessment of the level of involvement by state agencies, environmental actors, and private financial institutions.
As China has ascended to the larger national source of GHG emissions and the secondlargest economy worldwide, the way in which its carbon markets operate will have significant implications for climate mitigation at the global level using market mechanisms. Our analysis is not only useful for ascertaining the unique properties of the ETSs situated in this incomplete capitalist economy (i.e. China), but also has broader implications for understanding the ETSs being considered in other developing countries.
We begin by describing in detail the carbon trading activities in China and outline the two phases of market development. This is followed by separate discussions on the role and influence of the state, environmental actors, and finance in developing the carbon markets. The conclusions summarize and highlight the importance of state involvement in the market development process.
Market Building: Progress in China
Market proliferation (2005 -2010) China entered into the carbon trading community as a primary producer of emissions reductions under the CDM of the Kyoto Protocol. The CDM allows developed countries to meet their emissions reduction targets at lower costs by providing financial support to projects that cut or avoid GHG emissions in developing countries and then acquiring emissions reductions that satisfy the criteria approved by the CDM Executive Board, known as Certified Emission
Reductions (CERs).
China is the largest supplier of CERs, currently hosting 52 percent of the projects registered under the CDM and producing 61.9 percent of the expected CERs from registered projects i . Active involvement in the CDM was preceded by some initial hesitation (Han et al. 2012 ). The Chinese government did not endorse the implementation of CDM until 2004, after the first project had already been registered in Brazil. From mid-2005, CDM activities received increasing support and better coordination by national government agencies and quickly gained momentum across the country (Han et al. 2012; Zhang 2010 The early years of CDM implementation in China proved to be a learning period for all market participants. The growth in the number of local firms and project developers participating was not followed by a parallel increase in the quality of projects. This is demonstrated by the decline in the rate of successful registration during the period 2006 to 2008, which is estimated by dividing the number of CDM registrations by national approvals (Figure 1 ). The rapid expansion of the domestic carbon markets exposed the problem of nationwide shortage of expertise and experience in building emission reductions projects in accordance with the highly technical and demanding CDM operational rules (Qin 2012 The NDRC appointed seven ETS pilot sites across the country, including two provinces (Guangdong and Hubei) and five cities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, and Shenzhen).
They account for 25.4 per cent of China's national GDP and 18.5 per cent of its population.
v Table 1 provides a list of key economic indicators and the assigned emissions reduction targets of these provinces and cities. They vary in economic capacity, political importance, and geography. In the north, Beijing is the nation's capital and political center, and the neighboring Tianjin is a northern industrial economic center. Shenzhen is an economic engine of southern China, a "Special Economic Zone," and a forerunner of the post-Mao economic reforms.
Shanghai at the eastern coast is a major center of financial activity for the country and aspires to become an international financial hub, whereas the inland Chongqing leads the south-western regional economy and is known for its high urban temperatures. Guangdong is the biggest and wealthiest province of China at the southern coast, whereas Hubei is at a lower development stage and geographically situated at the center of the country. These provinces and cities have been assigned different energy and carbon intensity targets, and all have established their own carbon or environment exchanges. The diverse locations allow the notion of ETS to be tested against different economic and institutional constraints prior to official adoption of a national scheme (Qian and Jin 2012) .
[ These provincial and municipal governments have assumed responsibility for designing the pilot ETSs. They have been given the discretion to determine the emission targets, the permit allocation rules, the sectors to be covered, and to develop both the systems of governance and market infrastructure. Core features of the pilot ETSs are listed in Appendix Table A1 . The pilot schemes were due to commence in the second half of 2013 to early 2014, and the proportion of local GHG emissions covered ranges from 35 percent to 60 percent. More than 600 firms in
Guangdong and Shenzhen will be included, as well as 420-600 in Beijing and less than 200 in the other regions. Heavy industries and the energy sectors are targeted. Initially most of the emission allowances under the ETSs will be freely allocated to selected industries based on historic emissions, but these may eventually shift to an auctioning mechanism. Carbon offsets can be used for compliance only up to 10-15 percent of the assigned emissions reduction targets.
Provincial or municipal GHG emissions will be capped under the pilot ETSs, but currently there is no clear official information on the level of caps.
Domestic ETSs in China are not limited to these seven trial zones. Other key cities, such as Hangzhou (Zhejiang Province) and Chengdu (Sichuan Province), have also announced emission trading plans. A new round of market proliferation is set to boom, but lessons from the over-development in the early years are still fresh in mind. Central coordination is underway to stabilize and discipline the expanding markets. This is supported by a series of measures, two of which are described below.
Strengthening regulation
The unchecked proliferation of exchanges may create several financial risks. In November 2011
the State This section has described two phases of the early development of China's carbon markets. During the second half of the previous decade, emerging carbon markets were overwhelmed by the influx of investment that led to the market overheating. From 2011 onward, the government has attempted to institutionalize carbon trading and strengthen the regulation of domestic carbon markets. The next section demonstrates how this market-building process was dominated by state agencies and their institutional dependents, whereas the involvement of financial industries, as discussed later, has had less impact.
Pervasive Influence: The Involvement of the State
In capitalist economies, financial institutions and businesses organize carbon markets via a coalition with state and environmental actors (Paterson 2010 (Paterson , 2012 Newell and Paterson 2010) .
The governing of carbon markets within China demonstrates significant differences in terms of the engagement and influence of these actors. This section elaborates on the role of the government.
China's carbon markets were initially built upon the CDM, which is governed by international institutions. As the CDM market proved a partial success, many institutions and actors in China started looking for domestic opportunities, such as voluntary carbon trading. In theory, governance of voluntary markets should be independent of the state in the developed world. As Spaargaren and Mol (2013, 183) explain, "Voluntary markets are not under the direct control of state agencies, and they cannot be abolished by states when performing poorly. They are regulated through private or moral forms of environmental authority."
In China, however, state control has never been removed from the domestic voluntary carbon markets. Although financial companies and international exchanges are involved in the establishment of major carbon exchanges in China, governments act as the main institutional driving force. Within the country, there is keen competition for new economic opportunities among local jurisdictions. Carbon markets manifest themselves as new arenas where local governments compete to attract the first lots of carbon trades and demonstrate their capacity to capture the new commodity (i.e. carbon offsets). Han et al. (2012, 21) anticipate that the number of Chinese carbon exchanges might eventually exceed one hundred, and that the rapid growth is driven by jurisdictional competition: "… the [carbon] exchanges are eager to establish themselves with talented staff and substantive business models so that they become cornerstones of any national or regional carbon market developments when the central government eventually take the lead."
Anticipation of a national ETS also prompted active responses from local government chiefs, who are appointed by the central government and keen on making their jurisdictions a "cornerstone" of Chinese carbon markets to demonstrate their good performance. Wang, Liu, and Chen (2012) conclude that this fierce competition has led to the chaotic proliferation of carbon exchanges in the early years.
While the Chinese voluntary markets are fragmented and many are not active, the one thing that they all have in common is strong government involvement. Although carbon exchanges in China are registered as corporate environmental equity trading platforms and not formally owned by the government, they are characterized by strong government backing (Han et al. 2012 ). Most of these exchanges are owned or authorized, directly or indirectly, by government bodies (Huang 2013) . Table 2 provides a list of carbon exchanges that we were able to identify. The majority of them are state-owned or state-controlled entities (including enterprises, equity exchanges, and research institutes) and have government bodies as their shareholders (see Appendix Table A2 for a full list). Active government involvement is particularly obvious in flagship exchanges, such as Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, which are created as a joint venture between local governments and state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
[ State influence is pervasive in Chinese domestic carbon markets. Market construction, operation, and participation are dominated by state actors; namely, central economic agencies, local governments, and SOEs. On the other hand, the role of environmental actors, including environmental authorities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in the domestic market community are less influential, a point to which we now turn.
Secondary Players: The Involvement of Environmental Actors
China's climate change policies have been driven by economic and security concerns rather than broader environmental commitments (Lewis 2010; Lo 2010; Tsang and Kolk 2010) . In keeping with the goal of continuing economic development, carbon trading is seen as part of the broader macroeconomic strategy for China (Lo 2013 ). In the governing of carbon markets, there are situations where economic agencies oversee or even displace environmental agencies.
Environmental authorities
Under the CDM, each participating country nominates an organization, known as Designated National Authority (DNA), to authorize and approve participation in CDM projects before submitting them to the CDM Executive Board for registration. All DNAs are government agencies or their delegates. The majority of them are environment departments or ministries, or agencies with an explicitly stated environment-related portfolio, vi regardless of the scale of country or the type of economic system. China is one of the few exceptions, because an economic planning agency, the NDRC, is charged with granting national approvals for proposed CDM projects. This does not, however, mean that environmental aspects are excluded from consideration. As well as being responsible for economic and development policies, the NRDC has a subsidiary climate change department which is the executive arm of the Chinese DNA.
This organizational arrangement allows the integration of climate change considerations into economic policymaking processes. The structure is still hierarchical, and the climate change department is directly accountable to and supervised by senior economic officials whose primary responsibility is to promote economic development. Local environmental agencies are also largely absent from the pilot ETS working groups.
We solicited the ETS implementation plans of four selected trial zones (i.e. Chongqing, Guangdong, Hubei, and Tianjin) vii and investigated the involvement of local environmental agencies, such as environmental bureaus and forestry bureaus, etc. These implementation plans included a task assignment list or an explicit statement of responsibilities among different local government departments. Almost all of the ETS preparation tasks listed in these documents has been assigned to the economic or financial arms of government, notably the municipal or provincial Development and Reform Commissions (local equivalents of NDRC). Environmental agencies were only occasionally involved and often put at the end of the list (indicating lower priority). As an example, the official work schedule attached to the Guangdong ETS implementation plan is included in the Appendix Table A3 
Environmental NGOs
China's centralized environmental policy-making practice does not leave much scope for NGOs to take on key national issues (Muldavin 2013; Richerzhagen and Scholz 2008) , and they have little influence on the country's climate policy regime (Liu 2009; Lo 2010) . The governance of domestic carbon markets has been consistent with the traditional top-down approach (Qian and Jin 2012) . Participation of NGOs has been restricted to providing finance, raising awareness, and organizing capacity building activities for interested businesses or individuals (Huang 2013; Yu 2012 An example is the formulation of verification standards in the voluntary carbon market.
Tradable emission reductions are assessed by an independent third party to ensure that the claimed reductions are real, verifiable, and additional so that they can be used to offset an equal volume of emissions generated elsewhere. Although environmental professionals both within and outside the state have put climate change on their agenda, they appear to be merely secondary players following the lead of economic agencies in the building of carbon markets. Newell and Paterson (2010) argue that financiers and large corporations are the game changers in carbon markets. We now examine the role of finance in the carbon markets of China.
Limited Gains: The Involvement of Finance
The idea that carbon markets are promoted by a coalition of state and non-state actors, notably financiers, is based upon several assumptions. One of these assumptions is that, first and foremost, a cycle of economic returns from carbon trading is foreseeable. Financial actors are then motivated to lobby an influential policy or political community which possesses the regulatory and moral power to establish a carbon market to realize those benefits. However, the timing and the top-down approach in which the Chinese carbon markets were organized and commenced did not provide a favorable environment for the mobilization of capital and political investments in carbon trading. The Chinese carbon markets entered the process of institutionalization in an uncertain period so that the strong leadership of finance could not be taken for granted. We elaborate on this in two separate subsections.
An awkward moment: Big commitment amidst huge uncertainties
China pledged to institutionalize its domestic carbon markets in early 2011 and approved pilot
ETSs later that year. Optimism in the global economy, carbon trading, and the larger environment declined toward the end of 2011 and 2012. This is not the best time for China to step in, given that Chinese policymakers used to be very cautious toward carbon trading as a climate policy instrument (Wu 2011; Zhang 2007) . In 2010, there was a gradual decline in confidence in the market due to the lingering economic uncertainties and the lack of substantive global agreements. Federal proposals for a national cap-and-trade system were withdrawn in Australia and the U.S, both of them being the two highest per capita GHG emitters. Australian federal government encountered legislative hurdles and finally decided to defer a controversial ETS proposal. Kevin Rudd lost the prime ministership and his successor, Julia Gillard, initially appeared to reject the idea of Australian ETS, which later proved to be another political disaster. In the U.S., the Waxman-Markey bill, which had emissions trading as its centerpiece, was defeated in the Senate. After mid-term elections in November 2010, President Obama put his preferred cap-and-trade program on hold.
In December 2010, the Japanese government indicated its intention to shelve a planned mandatory cap-and-trade scheme, which would have become Asia's first national ETS (Perdan and Azapagic 2011) . Similar schemes were also watered down in Canada, New Zealand, and South Korea. In the U.S., one of the major climate exchanges, the Chicago Climate Exchange, shut down its carbon trading program due to inactivity in U.S. carbon markets. The year concluded without substantive agreements on international and national emission reductions in the Cancun climate change conference, and consequently, mounting uncertainties over the post-2012 Kyoto commitments. Pessimism toward the future of the global emissions reductions effort continued to loom.
In March 2011 a major earthquake and tsunami hit Japan, leading to the disastrous Fukushima nuclear accident. This catastrophic event raised public concern about the extensive use of nuclear energy needed to sustain deep cuts in GHG emissions (Rudolph and Schneider, 2013) , effectively killing off the Japanese ETS. Regional carbon trading in the U.S. also entered a difficult time. In early 2011, several U.S. states hesitated to act on their joint agreements to pursue a regional ETS (Perdan and Azapagic 2011) . In Europe, the sovereign debt crisis remained unresolved. Some EU Member States promised large-scale austerity measures in order to secure bailout loans. Financial markets expressed serious doubt about the credit-worthiness of individual Member States. Market demand for emissions reductions diminished as a result of the lingering uncertainties over the European economy and the contraction of economic activities.
These uncertainties were reflected in falling carbon prices recorded in various carbon markets (Newell, Pizer, and Raimi 2013) . This year, again, concluded with the failure to confirm the extension of the Kyoto Protocol at the annual UN conference.
China announced its carbon trading program amidst these bleak global conditions. [FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] Interestingly China's confidence in carbon trading and actions ran opposite to global political and economic tendencies. The unusual responses on the part of China are ascribed to the strong will of the state to raise its influence in global climate governance and carbon markets (Lo, 2012 (Lo, , 2013 . The role of finance also warrants attention.
The market uncertainties throughout 2009-2011 gave little momentum and reduced the need for businesses to undertake aggressive emissions reduction. Financiers found no strong market demand for carbon credits. As shown in Figure 2 , markets were shut and prices collapsed.
This offered little motivation for financial actors to promote carbon trading in China. CDMrelated activities dominated the daily business of Chinese carbon exchanges, but before 2012 there was widespread concern that the CDM would cease to operate (Lewis 2009 
Low incentives for non-state finance
Non-state economic actors do not actively engage in environmental issues generally (Buckingham and Jepson 2013; Mol 2006) . Mol (2006, 52) has noted that in China, economic
and financial institutions such as insurance companies, banks, and business associations "have virtually no role to play in advancing environmental interests." According to Mol (2006) , this is because these institutions feel no pressure or see any market opportunity from active engagement.
This view accurately describes the current situation of climate finance and specifically carbon trading in China.
The 2012 China Climate Finance Report has indicated that public funds currently dominate the total investment in climate finance in China (Wang, Liu, and Chen 2012; see The Climate Group [2013] for a concise English version). In 2011 state-owned banks offered US$294 billion and direct government climate spending amounted to US$41 billion, whereas mainstream private sector investment, such as domestic and foreign bank loans, accounted for around $US10
billion (The Climate Group 2013, 2) . This shows that private funds are currently not the main source of climate finance in China. There are also no established systems to direct private capital to the carbon financial markets. This stands in contrast to the fact that, globally, private investment was the main source of climate mitigation finance (Grubb et al. 2011) .
A number of structural problems have undermined the development of carbon financial industry in China. First, the regulatory and policy systems are not conducive to the deployment of climate finance. Regulatory standards and official data on emissions are far from complete and consistent, making it difficult for financial institutions to assess the economic and environmental viability or risk of applications. The legal system remains incomplete and fragile.
This raises the risk of financial frauds and gives little protection to investors in the event of financial breakdowns (Wang, Liu, and Chen 2012; The Climate Group 2013 Carbon trading is a more specific area of climate finance that requires a functioning market to deliver efficient outcomes. The regulatory and policy environment is, again, the key determinant of success or failure. According to Adams (2013) , the central government forbade
Chinese banks and some other financial institutions from getting involved in the CDM and appears reticent to allow them to participate in the China's domestic carbon markets. Securities regulators do not view carbon trading as falling under the purview of "finance" and tend not to assume direct responsibility for regulating carbon markets (Adams 2013) . Indeed, there has been a "culture of distrust in business," creating considerable institutional barriers to corporations and financiers interested in carbon trading (Wang 2013, 273) . Carbon asset management firms, for instance, have no significant impacts on the institutional development of Chinese voluntary carbon markets. Neither the central nor local governments consider those firms as indispensable components of domestic carbon trading systems (Huang 2013) . On the other hand, state-owned economic entities have been trusted and given access to resources and opportunities for market participation (as we have shown earlier in this paper).
The market structure in its current form does not appear attractive to businesses and financial institutions. Not many Chinese businesses take corporate social responsibility seriously, and they have no legal obligations to curb their emissions. This leads to low demand for carbon credits and related financial services. On the supply side, Chinese carbon exchanges are currently only allowed to operate spot markets that globally account for only a small share of the carbon trades, whereas futures markets constitute the lion's share (Wang, Liu, and Chen 2012 (Heilmann 2005a, b) .
Likewise, the lobbying power of other emissions-intensive industries is constrained. Most of the domestic industrial organizations have government backing and many consist of state-owned enterprises, such as the China Electricity Council (Yu 2012) . They have access to state leaders and the ability to influence government policy through the immediate party political system.
Private financial and economic institutions without backing from government bodies are excluded from the center of power and have not been influential in the policymaking processes.
Unlike major carbon markets rooted in industrialized economies (Paterson 2010 (Paterson , 2012 , the coalition of Chinese carbon market actors is led by an authoritative government, and predominantly by economic bureaucrats, whereas the representation and power of environmental actors and non-state financial actors is relatively limited. The relationship between the state and finance is hierarchical in the organization of carbon markets. As a "socialist market economy,"
China has put the market-based policy instrument of carbon trading under a substantial concentration of state power. The extent to which it is truly "market-based" is a subject of concern for policy-makers in other economies exploring the prospects for linking their domestic 
